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Abstract
One of the consequences of ineffective governments is that they leave space for unlicensed and unregulated
informal providers without formal training to deliver a large proportion of health services. Without institutions that
facilitate appropriate health care transactions, patients tend to navigate health care markets from one inappropriate
provider to another, receiving sub-optimal care, before they find appropriate providers; all the while incurring
personal transaction costs. But the top-down interventions to address this barrier to accessing care are hampered
by weak governments, as informal providers are entrenched in communities. To explore the role that communities
could play in limiting informal providers, we applied the transaction costs theory of the firm which predicts that
economic agents tend to organise production within firms when the costs of coordinating exchange through the
market are greater than within a firm. In a realist analysis of qualitative data from Nigeria, we found that community
health committees sometimes seek to limit informal providers in a manner that is consistent with the transaction
costs theory of the firm. The committees deal not through legal sanction but by subtle influence and
persuasion in a slow and faltering process of institutional change, leveraging the authority and resources
available within their community, and from governments and NGOs. First, they provide information to reduce
the market share controlled by informal providers, and then regulation to keep informal providers at bay
while making the formal provider more competitive. When these efforts are ineffective or insufficient,
committees are faced with a “make-or-buy” decision. The “make” decision involves coordination to co-produce
formal health services and facilitate referrals from informal to formal providers. What sometimes results is a
quasi-firm—informal and formal providers are networked in a single but loose production unit. These findings
suggest that efforts to limit informal providers should seek to, among other things, augment existing
community responses.
Keywords: Informal providers, Health care markets, Community health committees, Primary health care,
Transaction costs, Governance, Nigeria
* Correspondence: seye.abimbola@sydney.edu.au
1School of Public Health, Sydney Medical School, University of Sydney, Rm
128C, Edward Ford Building A27, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
2National Primary Health Care Development Agency, Abuja, FCT, Nigeria
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2016 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Abimbola et al. Health Economics Review  (2016) 6:51 
DOI 10.1186/s13561-016-0131-5
Background
Informal health care providers are typically unregistered
and unregulated entrepreneurs operating in local health
care markets without formally recognised health care
training, although they may have received some informal
training through apprenticeships [1]. One of the conse-
quences of ineffective governments in many low- and
middle-income countries is that they leave space for
informal providers to deliver a large proportion of health
services [2, 3]. This is the case in the health care markets
within the communities in many low- and middle-
income countries. Users of health services in such set-
tings may have difficulty in obtaining, interpreting and
using credible information [4]. In addition, regulation of
the health care market may be ineffective due to the lim-
ited capacity (technical and financial) and incentives to
monitor and enforce the rules governing the demand
and supply of health services [3, 5]. These lead to a situ-
ation in which patients tend to shop around, receiving
sub-optimal or inappropriate care and incurring costs
and complications until they eventually (if they do) find
the appropriate health care provider who is able to
successfully manage their condition [2, 6–8]
Informal providers include drug sellers or chemists,
traditional healers, traditional birth attendants, and
village doctors. Their practice may be herbal or based on
modern medicine, and may also be general or specific
for procedures such as deliveries or bone-setting [1]. In-
formal providers thrive within local health care markets
without institutions that facilitate appropriate health
care transactions [2, 8–10]. The prevalence of informal
providers varies widely from one community and coun-
try to another—from 88% and 96% of all providers in
some communities in Bangladesh [11, 12] to 77% in
Uganda [13] and between 51% and 55% in India
[14, 15]. The uptake of their services also varies—for
drug sellers it ranges from 62% for diarrhoea in
Uganda [16], to between 36% and 50% to treat fever
in Nigeria [17–20], and 35% for sexually transmitted infec-
tions in Uganda [21]. In Bangladesh, 52% to 60% of con-
sultations are with different categories of informal
providers [22], 56% in India [23] and 71% in Nigeria [7].
In Uganda, 40% receive treatment for diarrhoea from trad-
itional healers [16] and in Mozambique 43% of pregnant
women deliver using traditional birth attendants [24].
Addressing the presence of and preference for infor-
mal health care providers in local health care markets
requires effective governance [25]. In 2007, due to con-
cerns that the presence of informal providers in local
health care markets was a potential barrier to accessing
formal providers, the government of Malawi imposed a
ban on traditional birth attendants, as a strategy to re-
duce maternal deaths. Within a year, there was about
15% shift (from 43% to 28%) in the communities where
the use of traditional birth attendants was highest at
baseline – 11% to formal providers and 4% to home de-
liveries assisted by relatives and friends. Many pregnant
women continued to use the services of traditional birth
attendants albeit illegally. The ban was controversial and
unpopular, it did not result in improved health out-
comes, and was lifted in 2010 [26]. More commonly pro-
posed policy responses to limit informal providers in low-
and middle-income countries include government inter-
vention to enforce existing regulation, provide training to
improve their services, foster relationships between them
and formal providers, and reduce demand for their ser-
vices by improving access to formal providers [1].
On the other hand, support for community-led initia-
tives has not been considered as a strategy for reducing
the presence of and preference for informal providers
[1, 2]. Community engagement in primary health care
(PHC) has been extensively promoted in many low- and
middle-income countries by establishing community
health committees which are linked to the public sector
health facility (typically the only formal health service pro-
vider) in the community. These community structures
have been established across many low- and middle-
income countries [27]. Studies show that the activities of
community health committees can lead to improvements
in the demand and supply of formal health services in
their community [27, 28]. In addition, community engage-
ment can move people from being passive consumers to
more active roles in service delivery, and in co-financing,
co-managing, and co-producing health services [28, 29].
In line with the national health policy, each commu-
nity in Nigeria is expected to have a community health
committee [30]. Typically formed through a participa-
tory approach, national guidelines specify that commit-
tee members may include ‘respectable’ members of the
community, the health worker in charge of the health
facility to which the committee is linked, representatives of
traditional, voluntary, religious, women, youth, and non-
health occupational groups (primary and secondary school
head teachers, and workers in the electricity and water sec-
tors), and notably, representatives of informal health care
providers such as traditional healers, traditional birth at-
tendants and patent medicine vendors [31, 32]. Thus, im-
plicit in the design of the committee in Nigeria is the
intent that they will influence informal providers, although
the guidelines are not explicit about the details of how,
under what circumstances and to what end. Understanding
these details is important for improving how the commit-
tees may be supported to address the challenge of informal
health care providers [29, 33]. We conducted a qualitative
study in Nigeria to understand how and under what
circumstances community health committees seek to limit
informal providers operating in their local health care
market.
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Methods
Data collection
The study was conducted between November 2014 and
January 2015 in four (out of the 36) states in Nigeria:
one in northern Nigeria (Kaduna), two in central Nigeria
(Nasarawa and Benue) and one in southern Nigeria
(Lagos). The states were chosen for their geographic and
ethnic spread. Each of the states has an average of about
20 local government areas. Two local government areas
were randomly selected in each state, and from each
local government area, two communities were purpos-
ively selected, for having a health committee. In all, 16
communities were included in the study. For the in-
depth interviews, four categories of study participants
were purposively selected based on their availability, on
granting informed consent to participate, and on their
potential to provide rich, relevant and diverse informa-
tion: (1) the health worker in charge of the health facility
and/or the longest-serving health worker at the facility;
(2) the officials of the community health committees,
such as the chairman, secretary and treasurer; (3) com-
munity members, i.e. individuals in the community who
are not members of the health committee, such as reli-
gious, women’s and traditional leaders; and (4) primary
health care managers employed by the federal, state and
local government levels, who provide support for pri-
mary health care in the selected communities. However,
for the focus group discussions, we included all commit-
tee members who were available, had not participated in
the in-depth interviews, and gave consent to participate.
We excluded potential participants who were less than
18 years old.
We developed semi-structured questions and prompts
to explore issues affecting the supply and demand of
primary health care services in the communities. If the
respondents cited issues related to informal health care
providers, the study instrument provided scope to probe
how and why and efforts to limit the influence of infor-
mal health care providers. The questions included: (1)
What are the challenges of health service delivery in this
community (or communities)? (2) What other health
care providers are in the community (or communities)
besides the health facility? (3) What do people in this
community (or communities) do when someone
becomes ill? (4) Who do you (or people in communities)
trust for information about health and health care? (5)
What would make people in this community (or in com-
munities) who don’t more likely to use the health
facility? (6) Who influences people in this community
(or in communities) to use or not use particular health
services in and how? (7) What are your (or committee
members’) reasons for joining the committee? (8) What
are your (or committee members’) challenges dischar-
ging responsibilities in the committee? (9) What
organisations (government and non-government) does
the committee (or committees) work with and how?
Notably, the part of the questions in brackets were used
during interviews with primary health care managers to
apply more broadly to the local government area or state
where they work.
We conducted one focus group discussion with health
committee members in each of the 16 communities in-
cluded in this study. Recruitment for in-depth interviews
continued until saturation of themes was achieved. In
all, we conducted 130 in-depth interviews: with 25 PHC
workers (of which 14 were health facility officers in
charge), and with 15 PHC managers working at the local
(7), state (4) and federal (4) tiers of government. We also
interviewed an average of 1 to 2 officials of each com-
mittee (making 29 interviews), 2 to 3 other members of
each committee (making 35 interviews) and 1 to 2
people in each community who are not committee
members (making 26 interviews). Each interview lasted
about 60 min and each group discussion involved 8 to
10 people and lasted about 90 min. Data were collected
by eight trained researchers in pairs; one pair in each
state over the period of about three months. Researchers
with postgraduate degrees in public health were selected
for their ability to speak the local languages of their re-
spective study states. They were briefed for the purpose
of this study by two of the authors (SA and KO). Re-
searchers and participants met for the first time dur-
ing the study, but there were prior telephone contacts
to schedule data collection. Interviews and discussions
were conducted within health facility premises or an
open space nearby. Researchers kept notes during the
field work and were debriefed by author SA at the
end of data collection. When required, the data were
translated to English by the researchers who collected
the data. The interviews and group discussions were
audio-recorded, and subsequently transcribed to aid
analysis.
Data analysis
In line with the practice of using the small sample case
study design to investigate informal institutions (consid-
ering the logistics, time and cost constraints of collecting
in-depth large sample data on collective action), the
study was designed as a comparative case study [34, 35].
Each community is the unit of analysis. We conducted
directed content data analysis by coding and categorising
patterns in the data based on an existing framework
[36]: two authors (SA and AC-O) read the transcripts
and independently reframed data from each community
based on the context-mechanism-outcome framework
used in realist analysis [37]. This is an approach to
theory-driven inquiry; an interpretive framework for
hypothesis formulation, data collection, analysis and
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synthesis, and for testing and refining theories to explain
how complex social programmes work. The aim of our
analysis was not to determine whether or not efforts of
community health committees “work” in limiting infor-
mal health providers, but to explore how the efforts
were influenced, enabled, and constrained by the inter-
actions between contextual circumstances and the rea-
soning of the actors involved. The realist approach
accepts the role of actors in change (i.e. agency), and
that while structural (and institutional) features may
exist independent of actors, they influence actors’ indi-
vidual and group choices and patterns of behaviour.
Given this ontological perspective, we sought to unearth
social layers (i.e. agency and structure) in order to under-
stand the phenomenon under inquiry; i.e. community ef-
forts to limit informal health providers. While the findings
in this study may not necessarily be generalisable to other
states in Nigeria and other low- and middle-income coun-
tries, the context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) configura-
tions which result from realist analyses can facilitate the
transferability of insights to other settings. This is because
these CMO configurations can be tested and refined with
empirical data in other settings [37].
For this realist analysis, we adapted the stepwise
approach to realist analysis proposed by Danermark et al
[38], in four steps. In the first step, we identified from
the transcripts, events related to limiting the use of in-
formal providers that occurred as a result of committee
actions, decisions or relations. These were coded as out-
comes. In the second step, we identified factors related
to the community or committee that either enabled or
constrained the outcomes (i.e. contexts). The list of out-
comes and context expanded as coding proceeded, and
they were debated, refined and adjusted between two
authors (SA and AC-O). Disagreements in coding and
discrepancies in interpretation were decided by consen-
sus among the authors, with insights from the
researchers who collected the data, and in consultation
with PHC managers in Nigeria.
In the third step, we iteratively reframed the identified
outcomes and context within theories in order to aid
our understanding of the phenomenon under investiga-
tion. We adopted the transaction costs theory of the
firm which predicts that economic agents tend to organ-
ise production within firms when the costs of coordinat-
ing exchange through the market is greater than within
a firm [39]. This conceptual framing was informed by
aspects of the data which support the following two
theoretical propositions (see Fig. 1):
1. Humans are boundedly rational economic agents
[40]. In this study, we define bounded rationality
as a situation in which users and potential users of
health services in a community are limited in their
abilities to identify appropriate health care providers.
In health care markets, consumers are limited by the
quantity and quality of the information they have,
their own cognitive limitations and the amount of
time they have to make the decision about which
health care provider to use or not use. Therefore,
rather than searching for the optimal health care
provider, consumers “satisfice”: they choose the
first available alternative that “satisfies” what
they perceive to be the minimum criteria for
addressing their health needs [41]. This
leads to many consumers incurring costs and
complications from one provider to another
before the appropriate patient-provider transaction,
which increases transaction costs of accessing health
care. The information asymmetry between service
users and providers that results from bounded
rationality is predictably worse in under-governed
communities with contextual attributes (e.g.
geographical or socio-economic) that allow for
the presence of unregulated providers [42]. The
transaction costs of accessing health care in such
a community will increase with increasing number








SUPPLY & DEMAND TRANSACTION
COSTS
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework that informed data analysis, incorporating the theories of bounded rationality, caring externalities and transaction
costs. Note: the initial level of transaction costs is part of the attributes of a community, i.e. context
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2. However, people care about the health of others
and their ability to access health care services.
This is described in economic terms as the “caring
externalities” of health care markets. In other words,
the social benefit of health care exceeds private
benefit [43]. Therefore, individuals with relatively
higher capacity to distinguish providers within
the local health care market based on expected or
experienced quality of services, will have a tendency
to contribute (if they are able, given the context)
towards reducing the transaction costs of accessing
health care for people in their community. When
the transaction costs of accessing health care are
sufficiently high, such individuals will seek to change
the institutions governing the demand and supply
of health care services in their community; from
governance through the price mechanism in the
local health care market, to network or collective
governance, in which community representatives,
through the community health committee, take
an active role in the local health care market to
reduce the transaction costs of accessing health
care [44]. The local health care market becomes a
“quasi-firm”, consisting of the people and health
care provider(s) working together as a unified
production unit of health care services in a
community.
In the fourth step, informed by these theoretical prop-
ositions, we sought to identify the reasoning process (i.e.
mechanisms) that led to the outcomes, in line with the
findings of an earlier study on how community health
committees function in Nigeria [29]—see Table 1.
Ethics
Ethics approval for this study was provided by the
National Health Research Ethics Committee of Nigeria.
Participation was voluntary, based on the participant
signing a written informed consent form. In line with
the terms of consent to which participants agreed, the
data for this study are not publicly available and all par-
ticipants have been de-identified, by removing poten-
tially identifying information such as name, gender,
cadre, community and local government area of partici-
pants. The de-identified data are available on request,
but in reporting the findings, we included superscripts
linked to a combination of letters and numbers (see
Endnotes) referring to communities or PHC managers
when the context, mechanism or outcome being re-
ported occurred, was identified or described in that
community or by the PHC manager. We used the first
letter of each state to denote the state, the letters A and
B to denote the two local government areas in each
state, and the numbers 1 and 2 to denote the
communities in each local government area. A finding
from community number 1 in local government A in
Benue is marked BA1. When reference is being made to
a local government PHC manager, it is to the first letter
of the state, and the local government whether A or B;
e.g. BA or BB. When reference is being made to a state
PHC manager, the letter S is used in combination with
the first letter of the state; e.g. BS. When reference is
being made to a federal PHC manager, the letter F is
used in combination with the first letter of the state in
which the federal PHC manager is based; e.g. BF.
Results
We obtained information from 223 community health
committee members; 64 of whom participated in the in-
terviews and 159 in the discussions. Of the participants
who were community health committee members, there
were 40 in Lagos, 43 in Benue, 77 in Nasarawa and 63
in Kaduna. Their average age ranged from 43 years in
Kaduna to 49 years in Lagos, with overall average age of
46 years. The male to female distribution in Lagos was
1:1, whereas it was 2:1 in Benue, Nasarawa and Kaduna.
Lagos had the highest proportion of committee mem-
bers with tertiary education, with 50% having attained
some form of tertiary education. Further, 80% of com-
mittee members in Lagos had a dependable income
either as business owners or civil servants, compared to
between 38% (Benue) and 57% (Nasarawa and Kaduna).
In Benue, 62% of committee members were either un-
employed or subsistence farmers with no ready cash in-
come, while 43% of committee members in Nasarawa
Table 1 Modes of functioning of commmunity health
committees in Nigeria
The mechanisms that informed outcome strategies to limit informal
health providers were coded as:
▪ ‘Village Square’ (Mode I)
— if the outcome was achieved by the committee using meetings
and the personal network of individual members to limit informal
providers in their community;
▪‘Community Connectors’ (Mode II)
— if the outcome was achieved as committee members connect the
voice of one category of health system actors to ears of other health
system actors in the community;
▪‘Government Botherers’ (Mode III)
— if the outcome was achieved by committee members connecting
the voice of community members and health workers to the ears of
government officials;
▪ ‘Back-up Government’ (Mode IV)
— if the outcome was achieved by committees acting as back-up to
the government; co-financing or co-managing health services with
governments or NGOs;
▪ ‘General Overseers’ (Mode V)
— if the outcome was achieved by the committee positioning itself as
overseers of the day to day running of health services, and financing
health care through user charges.
Source: Abimbola et al. [29]
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and Kaduna were in this category, but only 18% in
Lagos. Based on the interviews, discussions and ob-
servations, we identified three categories of events
resulting from the actions, decisions and relations of
community health committee members which may in-
fluence the use of informal health care providers: in-
formation, regulation and coordination – see Table 2
and Fig. 2.
Information
The idea of having a community health committee was
typically introduced to communities by government
PHC managers1 and NGO representatives.2 But the idea
also arose spontaneously,3 triggered by concerns about
the challenges experienced and costs incurred by people
in accessing health care. In such settings, the founding
mission of the committees included self-support due to
government neglect4 and a commitment to reduce ma-
ternal and child deaths by stopping women from deliver-
ing at home unattended or by traditional birth
attendants.5 The founding mission also included wanting
to improve the uptake of formal health services6 Even
when not spontaneous, communities see having such a
committee as an opportunity to address health care
challenges in the community, motivated by the altruistic
desire to see more community members use existing for-
mal health services in the community.7 Essentially, com-
mittee members say to the community: “the health
facility is there, cheaper8 and of better quality9 than the
alternatives, and put in place by your government, so
please use it; it’s your right,10 take advantage of the
opportunity.”








Formal – Encouraging the use of formal
services at the health facility through
personal contact and campaigns
Informal – Discouraging the use of
informal health care providers community
through personal contact
Mode I: Village Square
Mode II: Community Connectors
Mode III: Government Botherers
Mode IV: Back-up Government
Mode V: General Overseers
* Triggered by need to reduce the
transaction costs of accessing health
care
■ Having the autonomy to modify membership to have
committee members with rich personal network and
wide reach in the community.
■ Significant health events like disease outbreaks and
vaccine refusal and support to conduct information
campaigns from governments, NGOs and traditional
leaders.
■ High cost of participation in meetings and information
campaigns in
large communities and where members cannot afford
the cost of transportation.
■ The extent of competition from informal providers in
the local health care market – low levels of competition
removes necessity for information campaigns.
Regulation
Formal – Monitoring formal health
service delivery to ensure responsiveness,
quality and credibility
Informal – Monitoring informal health
care providers to keep their activities
within safe limits
Mode I: Village Square
Mode II: Community Connectors
Mode III: Government Botherers
Mode IV: Back-up Government
Mode V: General Overseers
* Triggered by need to reduce the
transaction costs of accessing health
care
■ Having responsive government PHC managers who
discipline health workers or transfer them elsewhere
at the behest of committee members.
■ Traditional leaders who admonish health workers or
facilitate the link of committees to government PHC
managers to effect behaviour change among health
workers.
■ More challenging to monitor and regulate informal
providers out of the market when they are many and
control a large share of the local health care market.
■ Mentoring by NGOs to facilitate monitoring of traditional
birth attendants
and inviting them provide services in the health facility
to enhance monitoring.
Coordination
Formal—Mobilising resources to improve
the quality and accessibility of formal
services at the health facility
Informal—Facilitating referral from informal
to formal health care providers in the
community
Mode I: Village Square
Mode II: Community Connectors
Mode III: Government Botherers
Mode IV: Back-up Government
Mode V: General Overseers
* Triggered by need to reduce the
transaction costs of accessing health
care
■ Having high income people on the committee and in
the community who rely on the health facility, else
committees need traditional leaders to help raise funds
from them.
■ Highly networked communities where committee
members belong to other community groups helps
fund-raising from religious, women’s, youth and
cultural groups.
■ Mentoring on fund raising by and donations from
NGOs and traditional leaders; and mentoring on fund
raising from government PHC managers.
■ Having traditional leaders, women’s groups and
NGOs that help committees to broker agreements
between informal providers and the health facility.
Context–mechanism–outcome (CMO) configurations explaining how community health committees limit informal health care providers in Nigeria
Source: findings of this study
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However, committee messaging depends on which
provider is the major competition. Where the public sec-
tor health facility is the only formal health provider in
the community, the emphasis is on the health facility be-
ing of better quality than its competition.11 But what is
emphasised in Lagos where there are private sector for-
mal health providers is that the health facility is cheaper
than its alternatives12 or that it is the only health facility
that runs 24 h services.13 When chemists are the compe-
tition, members advise people of the dangers of self-
medication with drugs from chemists (e.g. more likely to
be fake, expired or wrongly dispensed) and they empha-
sise the lower cost of drugs at the health facility.14 When
traditional healers and birth attendants are the competi-
tion, committees emphasise the downsides of consulting
them by citing instances of bungled cases and their lack
of skills and diagnostic tests compared to the health fa-
cility.15 But where traditional providers are not a major
competition, there is less drive to displace them from
the market.16
Functioning in the ‘village square’ mode, the majority
of committees meet monthly and spread information
about services at the health facility through their family
and friends.17 Committees expand their membership to
include individuals with rich personal network—pastors
and imams who can reach out to their congregation,18
women and youth leaders19 and people who belong to
other community groups.20 But realising that they need
to do more to increase the uptake of formal health ser-
vices, committees position themselves as ‘community
connectors’, conducting information campaigns,21 and
providing information on services in the health facility
in religious gatherings. 22They also spread information
through weddings and naming ceremonies,23 community
meetings,24 and house to house visitations. 25Commit-
tees use town criers to announce clinic schedules, com-
munity outreaches and information campaigns.26
Committees also count on the word of mouth of people
who have used the health facility, tried informal pro-
viders and discovered how high the quality of services at
the health facility is relative to informal providers.27
Where cultural beliefs underlie the use of traditional













I – COMMUNITY WITH THREE INFORMAL AND ONE FORMAL PROVIDER 
II – INFORMATION RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF ONE INFORMAL PROVIDER III – REGULATION LEADS TO THE LOSS OF ANOTHER INFORMAL PROVIDER 
IV – COORDINATION LEADS TO “FIRM” GOVERNANCE OF PROVIDERS 
Fig. 2 Four stylised schematic depictions representing how community health committees may respond to informal health care providers.
Note: blue smiley faces represent community members; white smiley faces represent community members who became members of the
community health committee
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By spreading information through these channels,
committee members and other community members,
health facility officers in charge and government PHC
managers, report significant increases in the use of the
health facility and reduction in the use of informal pro-
viders.29 In some communities, particularly in Lagos, the
use of information is so successful that it displaced trad-
itional healers and birth attendants from the local health
care market.30 However, the costs of participation in in-
formation campaigns can be overwhelming for commit-
tee members who are unemployed or are subsistence
farmers who need to take time off their work for meet-
ings and campaigns,31 or in large communities with poor
access roads. 32In such situations, committees resort to
other mechanisms to ensure they conduct information
campaigns—as ‘government botherers’ they lobby the
government to support campaigns,33 as ‘back-up govern-
ment’ they raise funds from NGOs and the community
to support campaigns34 and as ‘general overseers’ they
use health facility revenue to fund campaigns.35
However, in spite of high costs of participation, some
committee members reckon that the benefits they derive
from participation outweigh the costs36; benefits such as
the dignity that comes with community recognition and
gratitude37; knowledge from the training they receive to
help them spread health information38; and being
treated at reduced prices when they and their family use
the health facility. 39But some committee members ex-
pect financial incentives whether or not participation for
them is costly, and they tend to resign when these are
not forthcoming.40 Such expectations are higher where
NGOs have once provided financial incentives41; in
neighbouring communities where committee members
wonder why they are not enjoying the same benefits;
and where community members are less willing to con-
tribute funds to support committee members even after
payments are discontinued.42 Nonetheless, the majority
of committee members work voluntarily without finan-
cial reward, and they encourage others to look beyond
financial benefit.43
Contextual enablers of the information strategy in-
clude the autonomy of committees to decide who to in-
vite to meetings and membership.44 For example, to
improve their information campaigns, committees invite
as members people who are outspoken, popular and can
pull crowds.45 Training provided by governments and
NGOs on how to conduct information campaigns is an-
other enabler of the information strategy.46 Events such
as disease outbreaks and vaccine refusal trigger informa-
tion campaigns by the committees. 47Government fund-
ing for information campaigns is an enabler of the
information strategy, with government PHC managers
using the occasional opportunity of funded campaigns to
provide financial incentives to committee members.48
But lack of competition within the local health care mar-
ket makes the information strategy less necessary. In
some communities, this happens only after an initial
period in which committees have successfully displaced
their competition from the health care market. Such
committees meet or hold information campaigns less
frequently, especially where the cost of meetings and
campaigns is particularly high.49
Regulation
Committees also engage in activities to ensure the re-
sponsiveness, quality and credibility of the health facility
to which the committee is linked, by monitoring and
supervising the health facility and health workers. On
the other hand, the committees also seek to keep the ac-
tivities of informal health care providers within safe
limits. Where information has been particularly effective,
informal providers self-regulate or exit the local health
care market.50 To displace informal providers from the
market, it is often necessary to build trust in the quality
and credibility of the health facility. But in spite of infor-
mation on which provider is appropriate, people may
not use formal health services because of disrespectful
and abusive treatment,51 health worker absenteeism52
and unreasonably high cost of medicines and services.53
Working as ‘village square’, committees obtain these
feedback during general community meetings,54 and
when non-members attend committee meetings to dis-
cuss the challenges they experience while using the
health facility.55 People also give feedback during infor-
mation campaigns when committees are functioning as
‘community connectors’.56
Functioning in the ‘back-up government’ and ‘general
overseers’ modes, committee members ask health facility
officers in charge about inappropriate behaviour of
health workers,57 and they also meet with people indi-
vidually to find out what will increase their preference
for the health facility.58 Committee members visit the
health facility, observe health workers as they deliver
services, listen to the complaints of people accessing
care and intervene immediately or during their monthly
meetings.59 Usually once a week, committee members
visit the health facility unannounced to check absentee-
ism.60 To ensure that the health facility can outcompete
other providers in the health care market, committees
set the price medicines and services accordingly,61 a
strategy that is enabled where committees operate
government-established revolving funds for drugs and
service uptake is sufficient to afford such price flexibil-
ity.62 In addition, committee members visit the health fa-
cility to ensure that people are not being overcharged63;
and also ask people how much they buy drugs in the
health facility to ensure it is according to government
price schedules.64
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However, committees achieve the outcome of respect-
ful service delivery, appropriate prices and reduced ab-
senteeism65; especially where, as ‘government botherers’,
there is recourse to responsive government PHC man-
agers who are willing to exercise a strong hand in discip-
lining health workers66 or having them transferred
elsewhere.67 These outcomes are constrained where
committees do not enjoy good relations with govern-
ment PHC managers.68 But even with unresponsive gov-
ernment PHC managers, these outcomes are still
achieved where traditional leaders admonish health
workers or facilitate their link to government decision-
makers.69 In addition, committees lobby to reverse the
transfer of high-performing health workers.70 They also
convince health workers to modify or reorganise service
delivery at the health facility to ensure greater uptake;
such as creating a first aid outpost to reduce the need
for trips to the health facility in a large community,71
changing the immunisation and clinic days to the market
day so that it is convenient for mothers, 72and allowing
pregnant women to deliver lying on the floor as they
prefer and are allowed to do by traditional birth atten-
dants.73 By these means, committees increase the uptake
of formal health services.74
Unlike the health facility where there is a recourse to
governments as the employer of health workers, it is
more challenging to enforce rules governing the supply
of health services by informal providers. In this regard,
traditional healers and birth attendants enjoy significant
advantage: their services are in line with belief systems
of many in the community, they offer more flexible pay-
ment options, and where they live and work is closer to
more people than the health facility.75 For this reason,
some committees refrain from monitoring them, con-
cerned about their legitimacy to do so76; and others be-
cause the committee enjoys a referral relationship which
they are careful not to ruffle.77 However, where there is
only one informal provider in a community, committees
are sometimes able to ease them out of the local health
care market by offering them jobs—in some cases as a
cleaner or security guard in the health facility. 78But eas-
ing them out of the market is more challenging where
they control a larger share of the market due to their
sheer number. In these and other communities, commit-
tee members monitor traditional healers and birth atten-
dants79 Enabled by NGO mentoring, some committees
combine monitoring traditional birth attendants with in-
viting them to bring their clients to the health facility
when in labour, so that health workers can directly
monitor and mentor the traditional birth attendants
as they take deliveries and address complications
immediately.80
Committees sometimes (as ‘government botherers’)
call on government PHC managers to intervene where
disagreement and conflict arise when committee mem-
bers find inappropriate practices as they monitor trad-
itional providers.81 But rather than seeking to dislodge
traditional providers from the market, committees gen-
erally focus on where they have more leverage—they try
to make the health facility more desirable.82 Compared
with traditional providers, it is even more challenging to
regulate chemists, who are typically the first port of call
for the majority of people, because there can be several
of them in a community, and they can be indispensable
when health facilities are often out of stock for drugs
and supplies.83 When they are many, the costs of moni-
toring and enforcing rules governing the supply of ser-
vices by informal providers can be challenging, and in
such settings committees invest in information strategies
instead.84 Conversely, where committees are not able to
meet and conduct outreaches regularly due to the high
costs of transportation, they are still able to monitor the
health facility; for those committees, this is a less costly
intervention.85
Coordination
The challenges limiting the use of formal health care
providers are sometimes beyond what the information
and regulation strategies can address. In these instances,
the committees seek to coordinate referrals from infor-
mal to formal health care providers; and they also seek
to coordinate resources from within and outside the
community to address the challenges of quality and ac-
cessibility limiting the use of the health facility to which
the committee is linked. Such challenges are identified
by committee members by virtue of living in the com-
munity, and as ‘village square’ from their discussions
during their committee meetings86 or while on monitor-
ing visits to the health facility as ‘general overseers’.87
The challenges range from long distance and bad access
roads to the health facility88; inability to afford the cost
of transportation89 or the cost of medicines and ser-
vices90; inability to offer 24 h services and long waiting
time for patients because health workers are insuffi-
cient91; health worker absenteeism due to lack of accom-
modation in the community92 and irregular salary93; and
the health facility being often out of stock for drugs, vac-
cines and other supplies.94
Enabled by having high income community members
on the committee, some of whom are invited on the
committee for that purpose,95 during meetings, commit-
tees (as ‘village square’) address some challenges in the
health facility requiring petty donations.96 But more
commonly, committees take their challenges to the gov-
ernment (as ‘government botherers), asking for funds
and support to address the issues limiting the uptake of
services in the health facility.97 In general, governments
in Lagos are more responsive.98 In Benue and Nasarawa
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where governments are less responsive,99 a low sense of
legitimacy,100 low expectations due to previous unsuc-
cessful attempts,101 and ignorance about the minimum
standard of services to expect from their governments102
combine to limit the capacity of committees to make de-
mands. However, having community and traditional
leaders facilitate lobbying efforts helps to bolster the
capacity of committees to relate with governments.103
Otherwise, they lobby when government PHC managers
visit, or they rely on health facility officers in charge to
lobby on behalf of the community, but with poorer re-
sults than when members of the committee do the
lobbying themselves.104
Given their experience and expectation of government
failure, committees sometimes lobby governments (as
‘government botherers’) only after they have tried other
means of addressing challenges such as raising funds
within the community and from NGOs (as ‘back-up gov-
ernment’).105 Committees begin to frame their activities
as reciprocating government or NGOs support.106 They
make monthly contributions,107 raise funds from other
individuals and organisations in the community and
from NGOs, and also volunteer their time and labour.108
Using their vehicle, committee members, and high in-
come individuals in the community help transport poor
people to the health facility,109 and also to bring drugs
and supplies from the local government headquarters.110
To assuage the effects of irregular salary payments, com-
mittees provide health workers with food stuff111; and to
improve formal health service uptake, they volunteer
their labour and skills to repair access roads to the
health facility.112 Committee members make donations
so that poor people in the community can use the health
facility without paying113; and health workers sometimes
sell drugs on credit or offer free services on their discre-
tion.114 The funds raised are also used to address the
reasons why people do not use the health facility.115
Raising funds within the community is enabled by hav-
ing high income people on the committee,116 and also
having other high income people in the community.117
Committees readily receive support when the health fa-
cility is the only formal health service provider in and
around the community and is thus used by high income
community members.118 In addition, committees raise
funds from local businesses,119 politicians,120 religious
groups,121 and other community groups.122 But without
the help of traditional leaders, raising funds is more
challenging when only the poor rely on the health facil-
ity and high income people have ready access to alterna-
tives such as a private health facility or general hospital
in the community or nearby.123 Enabled by the auton-
omy to determine their membership, committees expand
their membership to increase the number of people
who make monthly donations.124 Government PHC
managers, traditional leaders and NGOs mentor com-
mittees on fund-raising and sometimes make donations
to health facilities through the committees.125 To induce
further support and community appreciation, commit-
tees provide regular report on their revenue and expend-
iture to the rest of the community.126 But when they
generate funds from committee members, NGOs and
local businesses, they report only to individuals and or-
ganisations that support them.127
Committees as ‘general overseers’ augment funds
raised from the community and NGOs with funds
generated from health facility revenue (service charges
and medicines). With combined funds from all these
sources, committees build or rent accommodation for
health workers to reduce absenteeism,128 and employ
additional health workers as part-time or volunteer
staff to address the challenge of not having enough
health workers.129 Committees derive their sense of
autonomy to use health facility revenue by virtue of
weak government provision and oversight of health
services.130 In Lagos where governments are more in-
volved, government PHC managers control health fa-
cility revenue.131 Elsewhere, health facility officers in
charge control the revenue when committees have a
low sense of legitimacy or government PHC managers
do not trust them to manage the funds account-
ably.132 Committees also derive their sense of legitim-
acy and autonomy from traditional leaders, who also
monitor and require them to provide financial report
of health facility revenue to the community.133 Ac-
countability for funds among committee members is
another contextual enabler.134
When efforts to improve services at the health facility
are not enough to sufficiently reduce the use of informal
providers, committees seek to establish referral networks
with informal providers. Traditional birth attendants are
encouraged to refer pregnant women who consult them
to deliver at the health facility.135 When that fails, trad-
itional birth attendants136 (and also chemists137) are en-
couraged to refer their clients to the health facility when
there are complications or when symptoms fail to sub-
side. But even without complications, traditional birth
attendants are still encouraged to bring their patients to
the health facility immediately after delivery so that the
mother and baby can receive appropriate post-partum
care.138 However, committees avoid adversarial relations
with traditional birth attendants where they are seeking
to or have already established a referral relationship with
them.139 To facilitate networking, traditional birth atten-
dants are invited to meetings,140 counselled, and trained
with NGO support on danger signs in pregnancy.141
Enabled by traditional leaders, members of women’s
groups, and NGO officials who help broker agreements
with informal providers, the efforts of committees on
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these referral networks improve service uptake at the
health facility.142
In addition, committees seek to more directly connect
individuals in the community and the health facility by
influencing and supporting health workers to offer home
delivery services for pregnant women, especially in
Kaduna where preference for traditional birth attendants
is partly because they offer home services.143 Some com-
mittee members also actively seek out sick people in the
community and refer them to the health facility, based
on concerns that otherwise they would resort to self-
medication.144 But where the contextual enablers for en-
gaging with informal providers are absent and the com-
mittee has a low sense of legitimacy to engage with
informal providers, they focus instead on improving the
supply of services at the health facility.145 Efforts of
committees to co-produce and so improve the quality
and accessibility of formal health services also signal to
the rest of the community that the health facility is a
collectively owned resource that should be used.146 The
involvement of traditional and religious leaders, and
other influential people in committee activities creates
within the community a sense of ownership of the health
facility.
Discussion
The findings from this study reveal that community
health committees in Nigeria tend to act as institutional
entrepreneurs [45, 46] in response to high transaction
costs of navigating local health care markets. They use
three categories of strategies (see Table 2): Using infor-
mation strategies, committees can progressively reduce
the share of the market controlled by informal providers,
and regulation strategies can keep informal providers at
bay while making the formal provider more competitive.
When providing information and efforts at regulation
are ineffective or insufficient, committees are faced with
a “make-or-buy” decision. Depending on the context,
some communities are able to adopt the “make” decision
by coordinating resources and referrals to improve ac-
cess to formal providers; they become co-producers of
health care while facilitating referral linkages from infor-
mal to formal providers. In a response that is consistent
with the transaction costs theory of the firm, the net-
work governance structure that emerges from commu-
nity efforts creates a quasi-firm out of the local health
care market [39, 47]; a quasi-firm in which informal
providers are networked with typically the only formal
provider in a single but loose health care production
unit. The committees are therefore active players in the
local health care market of their community, acting in a
slow and faltering process of institutional change to
moderate the influence of informal providers and im-
prove the quality and accessibility of formal providers;
dealing not through legal sanction, but with subtle influ-
ence and persuasion, and by leveraging the authority
and resources available within their community and
from governments and NGOs (see Fig. 2).
These findings are in line with the evidence that,
whether for altruistic or self-interested reasons, com-
munity groups are able to manage their commonly
owned resources [9]. Indeed, there are elements in
the way in which these committees function which
resemble the strategies and circumstances that have
been shown to be effective in facilitating community
management of common resources. For example, self-
organisation is more successful in: 1) small communi-
ties where people share common values and trust one
another; 2) where people depend on the resource and
agree on how to sustain it; 3) where groups use the
existing leadership capabilities in the community—in-
volving people who are respected as community
leaders and elders, people with prior experience of
community organisation, and people of higher socio-
economic status; 4) where governments extend auton-
omy to community groups; 5) where NGOs provide
training and resources; and 6) where community
groups are large—especially when activities to sustain
the common resource are costly and the groups need
to raise funds, although larger group size also
increases the cost of self-organisation [34, 48, 49]. In
addition, our findings are in keeping with extensive exper-
iments on collective action for public goods, which show
that people cooperate, albeit sub-optimally, to produce
public goods; and that cooperation tends towards being
optimal in a small community setting where everyone is
aware of everyone else’s ability and level of contribution,
than in settings where communication and feedback is
more limited [44, 50, 51].
To limit the influence of informal providers within the
local health care market, the committees provide institu-
tions of economic governance: securing the property
rights of people to maximise the benefits of public goods
provided by their governments but derived from their
resources and taxes; facilitating appropriate health care
transactions while discouraging inappropriate transac-
tions; and encouraging collective action to provide pub-
lic goods including physical and organisational health
care infrastructure [44]. There are examples in the litera-
ture of individuals and community groups providing
support for health care by enacting different institutions
of economic governance, but these activities have not
been investigated and explained on their own merit
[28, 52–54]. This study suggests that the collective
action driven by the committees has underlying
motivation in a ‘caring externality’; a situation in
which individuals derive benefit from others having
access to appropriate health services [43]. In addition,
Abimbola et al. Health Economics Review  (2016) 6:51 Page 11 of 16
higher income members of the community have their
own self-interest in contributing to available health
services in their community especially when they de-
pend on the same health facility as others in the
community. The other private benefits for committee
members is that care at the health facility is often
subsidised for them and their family. Further, cultural
beliefs also influence committee members: another
incentive for participation is the sense of dignity it
brings for members as their contributions are recog-
nised by traditional leaders and commended by others
in the community.
With government failure (to provide and oversee
PHC) and market failure (due to information asym-
metry), community groups become a governance alter-
native [25], as their activities result in a network
governance structure bringing together formal and infor-
mal providers within the local health care market. It has
been previously hypothesised that three levels of govern-
ance—governments (constitutional), markets (oper-
ational), and community groups (collective)—function in
a dynamic balance in which governance failure at one
level is assuaged by governance at another level, such
that for health care in communities, government failure
leads to the dominance of market forces, which may be
mediated through governance by community groups
[25]. The mechanisms by which community health com-
mittees respond to these failures depend on context and
the challenge at hand. The findings of this study show
that in their efforts to limit informal health care pro-
viders, the committees function in all five modes identi-
fied in a previous study [29]—as “village square”,
“community connectors”, “government botherers”,
“back-up government” and as “general overseers”. These
five modes of functioning combine in each commu-
nity to inform the information, regulation and coord-
ination strategies of the community health
committees in response to high transaction costs of
accessing health care. Bottom-up initiatives are par-
ticularly important in low- and middle-income coun-
tries due to weaknesses in top-down governance [25],
leading to community groups taking on the roles of
government as they make, change, monitor and
enforce the rules governing the demand and supply of
health care in their community.
However, there are constraints on the capabilities of
committees to limit informal providers. First is a limited
sense of legitimacy to make, change, monitor and
enforce the rules governing health care in their commu-
nity. To gain legitimacy within their community, govern-
ment PHC managers and NGO representatives who
establish, mentor and support the committees should
encourage the involvement of influential community
members, particularly traditional leaders in selecting
committee members and in their day to day activities.
Second is the need for financial support from govern-
ments and NGOs to hold meetings and information
campaigns and to implement projects, due to the high
fixed costs of producing health care services. But given
that extrinsic rewards tends to undermine intrinsic mo-
tivation for high-interest tasks, especially when rewards
are tangible, expected, and not performance-based [55],
it is important that funds are not presented as rewards
or incentives, but for example, as occasional or matching
grants. Third is limited legitimacy and power to sanction
informal health care providers, demand accountability
from formal health care providers and make demands of
governments to provide and oversee health care. This
requires a mix of strategies, such as having traditional
leaders sanction informal providers and make demands
of governments and formal providers, providing com-
mittees with information and supporting documents on
the minimum standards to expect of governments and
formal providers to use while making demands, legiti-
mising their authority to demand accountability by
enshrining the committees in law, and fostering a demo-
cratic culture in which governments are more beholden
to communities and their representatives. Committees in
Lagos are more effective because it is the state with the
most enlightened electorate and effective taxation in
Nigeria [56]. Governments elsewhere have weak taxation
capacity, and community donations essentially replace
taxes.
The perceived cause of an illness (informed by reli-
gious or traditional beliefs) and the absence of
universal health coverage account in part for why in-
formal health care providers thrive in may low- and
middle-income countries. Informal health providers
also thrive partly because many instances of illness
are either self-limiting or have a low likelihood of
treatment complications, such that seeking care from
informal providers can be an effective cost-cutting
strategy. However, care-seeking pathways can be elab-
orate for chronic conditions with specific treatment,
raising transaction costs. In a previous study in
Nigeria, 67% of patients receiving treatment for
tuberculosis had earlier consulted chemists and trad-
itional healers, transaction costs accounted for 24%
of the costs of care, and 62% of transaction costs
were incurred during the first inappropriate consult-
ation [7]. This suggests that interventions should
include strategies to limit the costs incurred during
the first inappropriate consultation. Further studies
are however needed to characterise the transaction
costs of access to health care in different populations
and for different diseases. But due to cost, logistics
and time constraints, we were unable conduct a large
sample study, explore the costs of community self-
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organisation, interview informal providers and collect cost
data in this study which may have allowed for more pre-
dictive analyses of responses to transaction costs. How-
ever, evidence from legislations to ban informal providers
from twentieth century Britain [57] and China [58], to
contemporary Malawi [26], indicate a slow pace of shifts
in preference, which is facilitated by referral linkages from
informal to formal providers and “the gradual retirement
of the old guard” [57]. Historical studies could investigate
institutional change in countries where people have transi-
tioned to near absolute use of formal health services.
Conclusion
In summary, this study shows that supporting com-
munity groups such as the health committees can be
an effective policy tool to address the presence of and
preference for informal providers in low- and middle-
income countries where bottom-up initiatives are im-
portant because of the tendency for government
weaknesses. In studying and seeking to intervene in
such weakly governed health systems, it is therefore
important to consider the implications for access to
health care of the failure to provide information,
regulation and coordination within local health care
markets. Indeed, efforts to limit the use of informal
providers, whether by governments or NGOs (local
and international), should take into account the rela-
tive costs of intervening at each level of governance
(1. by strengthening the government; 2. by supporting
community groups; or 3. by working directly with
providers) with the benefits of reducing transaction
costs in the community. Having an empirical measure
of costs (i.e. transaction costs of accessing health
care) against which to compare the costs of interven-
tions to limit informal health care providers can in-
form the choice among alternative governance
interventions. In addition, considerations of potential
interventions should take into account existing com-
munity responses, the mechanisms through which the
community responses are enacted, the contextual en-
ablers and constraints of such responses, the suc-
cesses, failures and costs of the responses, and to
weigh those costs against the cost of intervening at
other levels of governance.
Endnotes
1(LA1, LA2, LB2, BA2, BB1, BB2, NA2, NB1,
NB2, KA1)
2(BA1)




7(LA1, LA2, LB2, BA1, BB, NB1, NB2, NA, KB1)
8(LA1, LA2, LB1, LB2, NB1, NB2, KA1, KB2)
9(LA2, LB1, LB2, NB1, NA1, NB1, KA2, KB1, KB2)
10(LA1, LB1, NA1)
11(NB2, KA1, KB2)
12(LA1, LA2, LB1, LB2)
13(LA1, LA2, LB2, BB1, KB2)
14(LB1, NA1, NA2, NB1, KA2, KB1)
15(BA1, NA1, NA2, NB1, NB2, KA2, KB1, KB2)
16(LB1, LB2, NA1, NB2)
17(LA1, LA2, LB1, LB2, BA1, BA2, BB1, BB2, NA1,
NA2, NB1, KA1, KA2)
18(LA2, BA1)
19(LA2, LB1, BA2, BB2, BB, NB2, KA1, KA2,
KB1, KB2)
20(LB2, BA2, NB1, KA1, KA2, KB1, KB2)
21(LB2, BA1, BA2, BB1, BB2, NA1, NA2, KB1)
22(LA2, LB1, LB2, BB1, BB2, NA2, NB1, NB2, KA1,
KA2, KB1, KB)
23(LB1, BA2, KA1, KA2, KB1)
24(LB2, BA1, BA2)
25(LB1, LB2, KA2, KB1)
26(LA1, BB2, NA1, NA2, NB1, KA1, KA2, KB1)
27(BA1, NA2, NB1)
28(LB, BA, NA1, NB1)
29(LA1, LA2, LB1, LA, BA1, NA2, NB1, NB2, NB, NF,
KA1, KA2, KB1, KB2, KB)
30(LA1, LA2, LB1, NB2, KA2)
31(LA1, LA2, LB1, BA1, BA2, BB2, NA1, NA2)
32(BA2, BB2, NB1, NB2, KA2)
33(LA1, LA, LB, NB1, KB)
34(LB, BA, BB1, BB2, BB, KB1)
35(BA2, BA, BB2)
36(LA2, KA2)
37(LA2, LB, KA1, KB2)
38(LA1, LB2, BA2, BB2, NA1, NA2, NB, KA1,
KA2, KB)
39(BA1, BA2, NA1, NA2, NB1, KB2)
40(LS, BB)
41(BA1, BA2, BB1, BB, NB2, NB, NF, KF)
42(BA2, BB1, NB2, KF)
43(LA, LS, BB1, NB1, NB2)
44(LS, BA1, BA2, BA, KB1)
45(LB1, LB2, KA2)
46(LB1, LA, LB, BA1, BA, BB, NA, NB)
47(BA1, BA2, NB1, NB2, NB, KA1, KB1, KS, KF)
48(LB1, LB2, LB, NA2, NB1, NB2)
49(LA1, NA1, NB2, KA2)
50(LA1, LA2, LB1, NB2)
51(LA2, LB1, BA1, BB2, NA2, KA1, KB1, KB2, KB)
52(BA1, BB1, NA2, NB)
53(NB)
54(BA2, NB1, KB1, KB2)
55(BA1, KA1, KA2)
56(LA1, LA2, LB1, LB2, NA1, KA2)
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57(LB2, NB2)
58(LB1, BA1, NB2)
59(LA1, LA2, LB1, LB2, BA1, BA2, NA1, KA1, KA2,
KB1, KB2)
60(BA1, BB1, BB2, NA1, NA2, NB1, NB2, NB, NF,
KA1, KA2)
61(BA1, BA2, BA, NA1, NB, NF)
62(BB1, BB2, NB1, KB1, KB2)
63(BA1, BA2, BA, BB1, NA2, NB, KA2, KB1, KB2)
64(LB, BA, NB2, NF)
65(LA1, LB1, LB, LS, BA1, BA2, BA, BB2, BB, NA2,
NB1, NB2, NS, KA2, KB1, KB2, KB, KS)
66(LB, LS, NB, NS, KA2, KB1, KB2, KB, KS)
67(LA1, LA2, LB1, BA1, BA2, BA, BB1, BB2, BB, NB1,
NB2, NS, KB1, KB2, KB, KS)
68(LB2, BB1)
69(NA1, NB1, KB1)




74(LA1, LB1, BA1, KB1)
75(LA2, LB2, BA2, BB2, NB1, NF)
76(LB2, BA2, BB1, NA1)
77(LB2, BA2, BB1, NA1)
78(BA1, BA2, NB2)







86(LA1, LA2, LB1, LB2, LB, BA2, BB1, BB2, NA1,
NA2, NB1, NB2, KA1, KA2)
87(LA1, NA1, NB1, KA1)
88(LA1, LA, LB2, BA2, BB1, BB2, NA1, NB2, KA1,
KA2, KB1, KB2, KB)
89(LA1, BA1, LB2, NA1, KB1, KB2)
90(LA2, LA, BA1, BA2, BB2, NA1, NB1, NB2, KA1,
KB1, KB, KF)
91(LA2, LA, LB1, LB2, LB, NA1, NB1, KB1, KF)





97(LA1, LA2, LA, LB1, LB2, LB, LS, BA1, BA2,
BB1, BB2, NA1, NA2, NB1, NB2, KA1, KA2,
KB1, KB2, KB)
98(LA1, LA2, LA, LB1, LB, LS)
99(BA1, BA2, BB1, BB2, NA1, NA2, NB1, NB2)
100(LB2, BA2, BB1)
101(BA1, BA2, BB1, BB2, NB1, NB2)
102(BA1, BA2, NB1, NB2)
103(BA2, NA2, NB1, KA1, KB1, KB)
104(BA2, BB1, BB, KA1, KB)
105(LA2, BB, NA1, NB1)
106(LA2, BA2, NF)
107(LA2, LS BB2, BB, KA1, KB1)
108(LB1, LS, BA1, BA2, NB1)
109(LA1, LA2, LB2, BA2, NA1, NA2, NB1, NB2, NF,
KA1, KB1)
110(NA2, NB2, KA2)
111(BA1, BB1, NA2, KB1)
112(BA2, NA2)
113(LA2, LB1, BA1, BA2, BB2, NA1, NA2, NB1, KA2,
KB1, KB2)
114(NB2, KB2)
115(LA1, LA2, LA, LB1, LB2, BA1, BA2, BB2, NA1,
NA2, NB1, NB2, KA1, KA2, KB1, KB2)
116(LA2, NA1, KA1)
117(LA2, BA1,, NA2,, NF, KA2, KB1, KB2)
118(BB2, NA1, NA2, NB1, KA1)
119(LA1, LB1)
120(LA1, LA, LB1,, KB1, KB2)
121(LA2, BB2, NA2, KA2)
122(BB2, NA2, NB1, KA1, KB1, KB2, KB)
123(LA1, LA2, LB2, BA1, BA2, BB1, NA1, NB2,
KA1, KB2)
124(LA1, LB1 LS, BA2, BA)
125(LB1, LB2, BA2, BA, BB2, NA1, NB1, NB, NS, KF)
126(LB2, BA1, KA2, KB1)
127(LA1, LA2, LB1, LA, BB2, KA1)
128(LB, BA1, BA2, BB2, BB, NA1, NA, NB2, KA2,
KB1, KB2)
129(LA2, BA1, NA2, NB1, NB, KB2)
130(BA1, BA2, BA, BB2, BB, NA2, NA, NB2, NB)
131(LA1, LA, LB)
132(BB1, BB, KA1, KB)
133(LB1, LB2, BA2, BB2, NA1, NA2, NB1, NB2,
KA2, KB1)
134(BA1)
135(LA2, LA, NA1, NB1, KB2)
136(KA1, KA2, KB1, KB2)
137(KA1, KA2)
138(BA2, NA2, NF, KA1)
139(LA2, LB1, LB2, BA2, BB1, NA1, NB2)
140(BA1, BA2)
141(LA2, NB1, KB1)
142(BB2, BA, NB1, KA1, KB1, KB2)
143(BB2, KA1, KA2, KB1, KB2, KF)
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